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Acts, Acquiescence, and Asylum: The Material Support Bar
Under Barahona v. Holder'
INTRODUCTION
Ever since passing its first immigration laws, the United States
has sought to provide a home for victims of the worst kinds of
persecution.! The humanitarian atrocities of World War II spurred
the introduction of deliberate, systematic programs for refugee
resettlement,2 and those programs continue today. In fact, the United
States continues to admit tens of thousands of refugees each year.3 At
the same time, there are limits to the ability and the willingness of the
nation to open its arms to refugees. Resources and institutional
constraints have always served as a check on the acceptance of
refugees,' but increasingly the government's refugee policy also
reflects national security concerns.' A delicate balance must be struck
between sheltering victims of violence and persecution, while keeping
out those who pose a threat to national security.6
The Fourth Circuit recently walked this fine line in deciding
Barahona v. Holder.' JOs6 Barahona arrived in the United States
from El Salvador, a country in the midst of a long and bloody civil
war, and specifically from a hometown ruled by the merciless violence
* @ 2013 Edward F. Roche.
1. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 812 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing the United States'
history of providing asylum for refugees, beginning with Congress's exemption for political
offenders in 1875).
2. See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES
AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 1-2 (1986).
3. Daniel C. Martin & James E. Yankay, Annual Flow Report: Refugees & Asylees:
2012, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 1 fig.1 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites
/default/files/publications/ois rfa-fr -2012.pdf.
4. See David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the
Careful Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 30,36-37 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991).
5. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (written testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary of
Homeland Security) (discussing the commitment of the United States to assisting those
seeking asylum, but also emphasizing the need for the Department of Homeland Security
to "keep [its] focus exactly where it should be: preventing the entry of .. . national security
threats").
6. See id.
7. 691 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2012).
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of rebel forces.' Those who resisted the rebels were banished or, like
Barahona's father and cousin, killed.9 When rebels demanded to use
Barahona's home, he acquiesced before eventually fleeing to the
United States.'o Was Barahona a victim of terrorism, or was he a
facilitator? The court held that he was the latter and thus did not
qualify for asylum.
This Recent Development argues that Barahona was wrongly
decided. The court did not provide the wrong answer; it simply
answered the wrong question. Specifically, the majority focused
exclusively on one question: Whether an alien is admissible to the
United States when he has materially supported terrorists, but has
done so under duress. This ignored a crucial preliminary question:
Whether a person can "materially support" terrorists without taking
any affirmative action. By finding the petitioner inadmissible based
on his failure to resist a terrorist organization, the Fourth Circuit
established a troubling precedent. The decision will pose particular
problems for asylum seekers, a group that already suffers
disproportionately as a result of the line-drawing inherent in national
security legislation." Taken to its logical conclusion, the Barahona
decision risks treating victims of terrorism as though they were
supporters.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the complex
system of statutory inadmissibility for aliens who have provided
material support for terrorism. Part II explains the background of
Barahona and discusses in detail the decision of the Fourth Circuit.
8. Id. at 351.
9. Id. at 352.
10. Id. at 351-52.
11. It remains to be seen whether these lines will be drawn any differently as a result
of potential Comprehensive Immigration Reform. While reform has ignited significant
recent discussion, it has not generated any legislation, and the future of the reform efforts
is far from clear. See Jonathan Easley, Obama: 'Price to Pay' for Immigration Block, THE
HILL (Nov. 9, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/briefingroom/news/189781-obama-
%E2%80%98a-price-to-pay%E2%80%99-for-republicans-blocking-immigration-reform
(reporting that President Obama "remained hopeful that Congress would overhaul the
immigration system before the end of the year," but lamented that reform was currently
"being held up"). Whatever happens, the existence and interpretation of the Material
Support Bar have not featured significantly in reform discussions. One bill, however,
included a provision specifically intended to soften the impact of the Material Support Bar
on terrorist victims. See Refugee Protection Act of 2013, S. 645, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013) (as
introduced, Mar. 21, 2013). The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, but
no action has been taken on it since then. S. 645: Refugee Protection Act of 2013,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s645 (last updated Mar. 21,
2013). Statutory reform of the Material Support Bar in the near future therefore seems
unlikely, or at least unpredictable.
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Part III evaluates that decision and argues that the majority missed
the key preliminary question of whether the alien had performed an
affirmative act at all. As the dissent contends, a closer analysis of the
plain language of the inadmissibility provisions would have
necessitated a different result. Finally, Part IV examines the future
implications of Barahona, with a particular focus on the additional
burdens that the decision will impose on those seeking asylum in the
United States.
I. THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR
United States immigration law contains certain statutory grounds
of inadmissibility.12 If any of these grounds apply to a particular alien,
that alien is "ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted
to the United States,"" even if he otherwise meets the requirements
for admission.14 For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act
makes an alien inadmissible if he has ever "engaged in a terrorist
activity,"'" which includes the commission of "an act that the actor
knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support ... to a
terrorist organization."16 According to its statutory definition,
"material support" includes "a safe house, transportations,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons...,
explosives, or training."1 This basis for inadmissibility is colloquially
known as the "Material Support Bar."'"
12. Those grounds are set out at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).
13. Id. § 1182(a).
14. In other words, an alien may qualify for admission to the United States as an
immigrant or nonimmigrant. Nonetheless, that alien may still be ineligible for admission to
the United States because of the statutory ground of inadmissibility. See id. § 1182(a)
("[A]liens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive
visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States."). Nonimmigrant qualifying
categories include visitors for tourism or business, id. § 1101(a)(15)(B), and temporary
workers, id. § 1101(a)(15)(H). Immigrant categories include spouses of UNITED
STATES citizens, id. § 1151(b)(2)(A), and individuals possessing exceptional talents, id.
§ 1101(a)(15)(0).
15. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I).
16. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc). The Act delegates authority to the Secretary of
State to designate groups that will be defined as "terrorist organizations." Id. § 1189(a).
17. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
18. See, e.g., Jordan Fischer, Note, The United States and the Material-Support Bar for
Refugees: A Tenuous Balance Between National Security and Basic Human Rights, 5
DREXEL L. REV. 237, 246-48 (2012) (referring to the specific ground of inadmissibility
contained in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) as the "material-support bar"). This Recent
Development will refer to the Material Support Bar as "the Bar."
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The Material Support Bar applies to a broad range of
prospective visitors and immigrants. Most obviously, it affects those
applying for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas at overseas consulates
and those seeking temporary or permanent admission at the border."
It also applies to certain categories of aliens that are already
physically present in the United States, including those seeking
asylum; although asylum applicants may remain on American soil
while their applications are processed, they have not usually been
formally "admitted" to the United States, and are therefore subject to
the Material Support Bar.20 The same is true for those who have
entered the United States surreptitiously; because they have not been
admitted, the Material Support Bar may render them ineligible for
any legal status that they may later claim.21
The Material Support Bar also serves to limit immigrants'
eligibility for a form of relief known as a "special rule" cancellation of
removal.22 Under that rule, the Department of Homeland Security
19. See supra note 14.
20. The Bar applies because asylum seekers usually have not been "admitted" to the
United States, as that term is defined in the statute. See § 1101(a)(13)(A) ("The terms
'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer."). Asylum
applicants are generally "paroled" into the United States, and are therefore explicitly
excluded from the class of aliens that have been "admitted." Id. § 1101(a)(13)(B) ("An
alien who is paroled ... or permitted to land temporarily as an alien crewman shall not be
considered to have been admitted.").
21. In the confusing terminology of the immigration laws, § 1182(a)(6) makes entry
without lawful admission or parole a ground for "inadmissibility." Grounds of
inadmissibility, set forth in § 1182, apply not only to those seeking entry, but also to
individuals who, though physically present in the United States, were not lawfully
admitted. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 583 ("[A] noncitizen who entered
without inspection is subject to the inadmissibility grounds, even if she has lived in the
United States for many years."). By contrast, grounds for "deportability," which appear in
§ 1227, apply to aliens who were legally admitted to the United States. See id. ("A
noncitizen who is in the United States unlawfully after overstaying a period of admission is
deportable, not inadmissible.").
22. See Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2012). To be eligible for
"special rule" cancellation of removal, the alien must show that four conditions are
satisfied: (1) he has been physically present in the United States for at least ten years; (2)
he has been a person of good moral character during that time (as defined in § 1101(f),
which excludes, among other things, "habitual drunkards" and those whose income is
principally derived from illegal gambling activities); (3) he has not been convicted of
certain crimes; and (4) his removal "would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" to a spouse, parent, or child who is a UNITED STATES citizen.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). The plain language of that section vests discretion in the Attorney
General. Id. § 1229b(b)(1). However, since the reorganization of the immigration
functions after September 11, 2001, the discretion is now exercised by the Secretary of
Homeland Security and her department. See Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Pub.
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has discretion to cancel the removal of an inadmissible or deportable
alien if the alien meets certain conditions. 23 However, certain aliens
are ineligible for "special rule" cancellation of removal, even if they
meet the prima facie conditions that permit the Department to
exercise its discretion.2 4 In particular, aliens inadmissible under the
Material Support Bar are ineligible for cancellation of removal
relief.25
II. BARAHONA V. HOLDER
A. Factual Background and Immigration Court Proceedings
Jos6 Barahona, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United
States without inspection in 1985.26 He first applied for asylum in
1987, but the government denied his application the following year.27
Despite being given thirty days to leave the country, he remained and
again sought asylum in 1995.28 He failed to take the necessary action
to maintain his asylum application, and as a result, the government
closed his application in 2007.29 In 2009, he appeared before an
Immigration Judge ("IJ") as an alien present in the United States
without lawful admission or parole.30 He sought "special rule"
cancellation of removal."
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 111); Exec. Order
No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Mar. 5, 2003).
23. Again, the language is not intuitive. "Removal" is the act of expelling an alien
from the United States. An alien may become removable in one of two ways: (1) by
entering without inspection and being inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); or (2)
by entering legally but subsequently becoming deportable, see id. § 1227. Entry without
inspection, often colloquially known as "illegal entry," is the process of physically crossing
into the United States without presenting one's travel documents to an immigration
officer.
24. See id. § 1182(a).
25. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
26. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 350-51; see. also supra note 23 (explaining entry without
inspection).
27. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351.
28. Id. It is not clear why Barahona was able to remain in the country after the
rejection of his first asylum application. Because no facts suggest that the government
granted him any type of relief, it appears that the government simply failed to enforce the
removal order against him.
29. Id. The government administratively closed his application for "failure to
prosecute." Id.
30. Id. Being an alien present without lawful admission or parole violates
§ 1182(a)(6). The Fourth Circuit opinion also reveals that Barahona pled guilty to a state
misdemeanor domestic assault in December 2007. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351. However,
this is irrelevant to his immigration proceedings. Most misdemeanors will not make an
alien inadmissible or deportable because, under the statute, immigration consequences
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The government contended that Barahona was ineligible for
relief because he had provided material support to terrorists in El
Salvador during the year before arriving in the United States.32
Barahona testified before the IJ about his involvement with terrorists
in his homeland.33 In the mid-1980s, El Salvador was in the throes of a
twelve-year civil war between the incumbent government and the
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberci6n Nacional ("FMLN").34 In
1984, FMLN guerillas seized Barahona's hometown of Carolina.s
The area erupted into violence.36 Guerillas would periodically arrive
at Barahona's home and demand to use his kitchen.37 He testified that
if he had refused, he would have been forced to leave town or killed; 8
his own father and cousin had already been executed by the FMLN,
and his father had not even been given the option to leave.3 9
Barahona acquiesced. During the year before he left El Salvador for
the United States, he allowed around 200 guerillas to use his kitchen
to prepare food.4 0 During bad weather, they occasionally slept inside
the house.41 The government did not dispute any of those facts.42
Prosecutors argued, however, that Barahona had afforded material
support in the form of a "safe house" to a terrorist organization and
generally attach only to crimes with a maximum sentence of imprisonment for one year or
more. See §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
31. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351; see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
32. See Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351-52. To reach the Material Support Bar, the
government worked through three separate interpretive steps. First, the categories of
those ineligible for relief include aliens who are inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3). Id. at
352. Second, an alien is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3) if he has ever "engaged in a
terrorist activity." § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I). Third, "terrorist activity" includes the commission
of "an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support ... to
a terrorist organization." Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc).
33. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351.
34. Id. For further information about the FMLN and the civil war in El Salvador, see
generally HUGH BYRNE, EL SALVADOR'S CIVIL WAR: A STUDY OF REVOLUTION
(1996); JOAN DIDION, SALVADOR (1994).
35. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351.
36. Id.
37. Id. It is not clear how frequently the guerillas used Barahona's home during the
course of the year.
38. Id. at 351-52.
39. Id. at 352.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 351-52. Barahona also occasionally provided directions to some of the
guerillas. Id. at 352. Neither the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") nor the Fourth
Circuit found this to be a factor in determining the applicability of the Material Support
Bar, apparently because it did not rise to the level of "material assistance." See id.
42. Id.
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that this constituted "material support" within the meaning of the
statutory bar to admissibility.43
The IJ recognized that Barahona had no choice but to
accommodate the guerillas and that he had only done so under
duress." Nonetheless, the IJ ruled that these facts were not relevant
under the statute.4 5 Since the Material Support Bar contains no
exception for duress or involuntariness, Barahona's acquiescence to
the guerillas rendered him inadmissible.46 The IJ ordered him
removed from the United States.47 The Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that there is not
a duress exception to the Material Support Bar.48
B. The Fourth Circuit Decision
In his appeal to the Fourth Circuit,4 9 Barahona maintained that
the use of his kitchen "occurred under duress," and that acts
committed under duress "do not rise to the level of providing
43. Id. The government based its argument on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)
(2006), which is the Material Support Bar. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
44. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 352.
45. Id.
46. Id. The IJ worked through the same steps in interpreting the statute as set out
above, supra note 32:
The sole INA provision underlying the IJ's rejection of the special rule
cancellation specifies that an alien is inadmissible if he has engaged in terrorist
activity by providing "material support" to a terrorist organization. "Terrorist
activity" is defined by the INA, and includes committing "an act that [the person]
knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support ... to a terrorist
organization." "Material support" includes providing "a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons .. ., explosives, or training."
Barahona, 691 F.3d at 352 (footnote and citations omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 353. Before the BIA, Barahona also made two additional arguments, both of
which were rejected, and both of which are beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
First, he argued that the use of his kitchen was de minimis, and therefore immaterial. Id. at
352-53. Second, he contended that the IJ's decision was inconsistent with international
law. Id. at 353.
49. As the court noted it its opinion, the administrative decision on whether an alien
may obtain cancellation of removal is generally not subject to judicial review. Id. Courts
can review constitutional issues or questions of law that arise in the administrative
decision making. Id. Here the court was reviewing a pure question of law: Whether or not
acts committed under duress could trigger the Material Support Bar. Id. By contrast, the
decision on whether or not to grant relief is entirely for the discretion of the government
and is immune from judicial review. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); Ixcot v. Holder, 646
F.3d 1202, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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'material support' " within the meaning of the statute.so The court
disagreed." In a split decision, it held that there is no duress or
involuntariness exception to the Material Support Bar and that
Barahona was therefore ineligible for relief.52
Judge King, writing for the majority,53 gave Chevron deference to
the BIA decision.54 If the statute was not clear on the application of
the Material Support Bar in this context, then the court would defer
to the interpretation of the BIA. The court agreed with Barahona on
the preliminary question of the Chevron analysis: The statute is silent
on the existence of a duress or involuntariness exception.5 But the
court upheld the BIA's decision at the second step of the Chevron
analysis, holding that the decision was a reasonable interpretation of
the statute." The court relied heavily on a textual comparison
between the Material Support Bar and a related provision which
allows aliens who are statutorily inadmissible to petition the
government for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility.5 7 The
government may not grant such a waiver to any alien that has
voluntarily supported terrorist activities. 8 By contrast, Congress did
not draw this distinction between voluntary and involuntary support
50. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Barahona, 691 F.3d 349 (No. 11-2046). Given the
arguments raised in Judge Wynn's dissent and in this Recent Development, see infra Part
III, Barahona should have cast his argument differently. The most compelling argument is
that he did not perform an act at all, but merely an omission, meaning that the Material
Support Bar should not apply. The duress point, on which the majority focused, is far less
compelling, and Barahona should have included it only as an alternative argument.
Although the distinction between the two arguments is subtle, the distinction makes all the
difference. It does not appear that Barahona intentionally conceded that he committed an
affirmative act. It seems instead, for reasons that are not clear, that he simply overlooked
this potential argument.
51. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351.
52. Id. at 354, 356.
53. Id. at 350. Chief Judge Traxler joined in the majority opinion.
54. Id. at 354 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984); Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 2009)). The Fourth Circuit
succinctly explained the two-step Chevron inquiry: "[First,] we initially examine the
statute's plain language; if Congress has spoken clearly on the precise question at issue,
the statutory language controls. If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous, we defer to
the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable." Id. at 354 (citing Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d
132, 136-37 (4th Cir. 2009)).
55. Id. at 354.
56. Id. at 356 ("It was . .. reasonable for the BIA, in its decision here, to decline to
create an involuntariness exception from the Material Support Bar.").
57. Id. at 354-55 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (2006)). The court explained:
"Barahona's lawyer advised at oral argument that her client had already applied for relief
under the waiver provision, and that such relief was denied by the Secretary of Homeland
Security in March 2012." Id. at 355 n.8.
58. Id. at 354-55 (citing § 1182(d)(3)(B)).
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in crafting the Material Support Bar.59 The majority thus "assume[d]
that Congress did not intend to create an involuntariness exception to
the Material Support Bar, otherwise the voluntary support exception
to the waiver provision would be rendered superfluous."6 The
existence of the alternative statutory waiver was also relevant for
another reason: Because aliens who have involuntarily assisted
terrorists can obtain discretionary relief even when the Material
Support Bar applies, it is reasonable to interpret the Bar as rendering
those aliens prima facie ineligible.6 1
Next, the majority looked at other circuits' interpretations of
other statutory bars to admissibility.62 It referred to Gonzalez v.
Holder," in which the First Circuit addressed the scope of the
"Crewman Bar." That provision makes an alien ineligible for relief if
he entered the United States as a crewman.' The petitioner in
Gonzalez argued that there should be an exception to the Crewman
Bar when the alien satisfies the statutory criteria of "special rule"
cancellation of removal prior to entering the United States.65 The
First Circuit, holding that the Crewman Bar does not contain any
exceptions, declined to "rewrite the statute."66 Drawing a parallel
between Gonzalez and Barahona, the Fourth Circuit held that the
Material Support Bar "simply ... fail[s] to provide for the exception
under which Barahona seeks relief."6 7
The court also dismissed Barahona's claim that the BIA should
have interpreted his case in light of the recent Supreme Court
precedent established in Negusie v. Holder.68 In that case, the Court
reviewed the BIA's refusal to read a duress exception into the
59. Id. at 355. Compare § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) ("[N]o such waiver may be extended to an
alien who ... has voluntarily and knowingly engaged in ... terrorist activity on behalf of,
or has voluntarily and knowingly received military-type training from a terrorist
organization."), with id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (making inadmissible any alien who has
committed "an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material
support," without regard to the alien's mental state when committing the act).
60. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 355 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010)).
61. See id. at 356.
62. Id. at 355-56.
63. 673 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2012).
64. See § 1229b(c)(1) (making an alien "who entered the United States as a crewman
subsequent to June 30, 1964," ineligible for cancellation of removal). A crewman is "a
person serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft." Id. § 1101(a)(10).
65. Gonzalez, 673 F.3d at 38.
66. Id. at 40-41 ("[T]he statute simply does not contain any exceptions. It plainly
precludes from relief any alien 'who entered the United States as a crewman subsequent
to June 30, 1964.' . . . We cannot rewrite the statute." (internal citations omitted)).
67. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 355.
68. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
324 [Vol. 92
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"Persecutor Bar."69 The Persecutor Bar renders an alien inadmissible
if he ever "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise. participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."" The
Court held that the BIA mistakenly viewed a previous Supreme
Court decision as controlling." The BIA's reliance constituted legal
error, as the purported precedent "addressed a different statute
enacted for a different purpose."7 2 The Barahona court distinguished
Negusie by finding that the BIA did not rely on mistaken legal
authority in this case." Rather, the majority found that the BIA
interpreted the Material Support Bar in a way that remained faithful
to the statutory scheme.74
Judge Wynn dissented." In his view, the court should have
reversed the BIA based on the first Chevron step because it is clear
that "passive acquiescence to the crimes of terrorists does not
constitute an 'act' that 'affords material support . . . to a terrorist
organization'" under the Material Support Bar.76 Judge Wynn
provided two arguments in support of his view. First, the Bar does
not, by its plain statutory language, apply to Barahona's interactions
with the FMLN." The statute renders an alien inadmissible if he has
69. Id. at 514.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also infra note 108.
71. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520. In Negusie, the BIA had held that the so-called
"Persecutor Bar" applied and prevented an individual from seeking asylum whether or not
the individual's acts were voluntary or coerced. Id. As a result, an individual who had
served as a guard in a concentration camp was ineligible for relief even if the BIA
accepted his argument that he acted under duress and was a victim rather than a true
perpetrator. Id. The BIA relied on Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), which
held that there was no involuntariness exception in the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) of
1948. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512, 518. In Negusie, the Supreme Court reversed the BIA's
decision, holding that Fedorenko does not control the interpretation of the Persecutor Bar.
Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520.
72. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520 (citing Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774,
62 Stat. 1009 (1948); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102-03 (codified as
amended at § 1101(a)(42))) ("Unlike the DPA, which was enacted to address not just the
post war refugee problem but also the Holocaust and its horror, the Refugee Act was
designed to provide a general rule for the ongoing treatment of all refugees and displaced
persons.").
73. Id.
74. Id. at 519-20.
75. Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting).
76. Id. Under Judge Wynn's interpretation, the BIA decision would fail at the first
step of the Chevron test in which the court should "initially examine the statute's plain
language; if Congress has spoken clearly on the precise question at issue, the statutory
language controls." Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
77. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 356 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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committed "an act that [the person] knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support ... to a terrorist organization."" But
given the facts in the record, Barahona did not commit any act; he
merely acquiesced to the guerillas' actions. According to Judge
Wynn, the BIA and the majority therefore confused the issue. 9 The
majority considered whether the statute permitted duress to be raised
as an affirmative defense or, in other words, whether there was an
available excuse for a person who had committed an act.o However,
in doing so, the majority neglected to ask a preliminary question:
Whether Barahona had committed an act at all.' In Judge Wynn's
view, the plain language of the statute requires an act. For the
Material Support Bar to apply, the alien must have done something
"beyond simply being the unfortunate victim of terrorists."82 But on
the facts of this case, Judge Wynn observed, "Nowhere in the record
before this Court is there any suggestion that Barahona took any
affirmative step, or otherwise performed or did any deed, that he
'kn[ew], or reasonably should [have known], afford[ed] material
support' to the guerillas."" Thus, because Barahona's conduct did not
fall within the plain language of the Material Support Bar, Judge
Wynn concluded he ought not be rendered inadmissible under it.'
In addition to the plain language, Judge Wynn used another tool
of statutory interpretation to support his position: "[I]nterpretations
of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if
alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are
available."" Judge Wynn used two hypotheticals to illustrate how the
majority's construction of the Material Support Bar could produce
bizarre results. For example, it could also bar an alien from relief if he
fled his home, reasonably believing that terrorists would occupy it
after he left." And it would still render an alien inadmissible "even if
he had taken some sort of action to prevent the guerillas from being
able to prepare meals, such as sabotaging his stove, if they instead
used his fireplace." Judge Wynn found these results to be
78. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2006)).
79. Id. at 356-57.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 358.
83. Id. at 357 (quoting § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 358 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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incongruous with the intent of Congress, which had specifically
written the statute so as to require an act."
III. EVALUATING THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION
The majority asked the wrong question. It focused exclusively on
whether the Material Support Bar contains an exception for acts
committed under duress. The court reasoned thoroughly and
persuasively on this issue in reaching the conclusion that there is no
such exception in the statute. 89 However, the majority's singular focus
caused it to miss what should have been the central issue in the case-
the requirement of an affirmative act. This produced a result that is
inconsistent with the language of the statute and the policy objectives
underpinning the Material Support Bar. This Part first demonstrates
the distinction between the "act" issue and the "duress" issue. Next, it
shows that the majority neglected this important distinction and that
this was a fatal error. Finally, this Part responds to some of the
principal objections to the viewpoint presented.
A. Distinguishing the "Act" Issue and the "Duress" Issue
In interpreting the Material Support Bar, like any statute, courts
may look to accepted principles and "terms of art" that Congress has
"borrowed" from other areas of the law.90 Although an "act" is
required to trigger the Material Support Bar,9' the statute does not
define an act or provide for a duress exception. In order to determine
how the Bar operates, it is instructive to consider the way in which the
"act" requirement and the defense of duress function in other areas
of the law.
The law traditionally takes two separate doctrinal steps in
determining whether to impose liability for a person's conduct.92 The
88. See id.
89. See id. at 356 (majority opinion).
90. Justice Jackson clearly articulated this principle in Morisette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1952):
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind
unless otherwise instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be
taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as departure from them.
Id. at 263.
91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2012).
92. This distinction most frequently occurs in the context of criminal law and torts. In
both areas, the law routinely imposes liability on the basis of actions, but offers certain
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first step is whether the individual committed a voluntary act. This
step itself has two components. An act must be distinguished from an
omission, or a failure to act.93 Liability only attaches to an omission,
or a failure to act, in very limited circumstances.94 Next, even if the
individual committed an act, he will be liable only if his act was
voluntary.95 To be voluntary, an act must be the result of a willed
contraction of the muscles. 96 An act that is involuntary, such as one
that occurs during unconsciousness,97 may not trigger liability." There
excuses as defenses to liability. Of course, immigration and national security statutes need
not necessarily adopt the exact same doctrines. Immigration law is a unique creature in the
sense that it is not really about imposing liability. Courts have long recognized that even
deportation, the most extreme form of immigration action, is not a penalty. See, e.g., Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (holding that deportation is a civil
action and not a penalty, and that deportation adjudications are not subject to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). However, there are no indications that
Congress intended for an "act" to be defined differently in interpreting the Material
Support Bar, or in immigration law in general, than it is interpreted in other areas of the
law. An "act" is not defined in the statute, and there are no other apparent reasons for
giving it a meaning that is different from the criminal or torts setting.
93. Black's Law Dictionary defines an omission as "[a] failure to do something,"
especially "a neglect of duty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (9th ed. 2009).
94. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining how
some criminal statutes impose liability for omissions: "The criminal statute itself imposes
the duty to act, and breach of the duty is made a crime"). See generally Otto Kirchheimer,
Criminal Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REV. 615 (1942) (explaining the general theories on
which the law imposes duties to act). In tort law also, there is "an ancient distinction
between 'misfeasance' and 'non-feasance.'" 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 324A cmt. f (1965); see also id. §§ 314-314B (imposing liability to act only in certain
defined circumstances, generally involving some special relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW $ 65.02 (2d ed.
2003) ("[U]nder common law a plaintiff who is not able to show a legally recognized
relationship or an undertaking generally cannot succeed in a tort action for failure to
act.").
95. For example, a voluntary (or "volitional") act is an element of the intentional torts
of assault and battery which require some kind of willed physical movement. See, e.g., 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (1965) (discussing these examples and
concluding "[tihere cannot be an act without volition"); SHAPO, supra note 94, at$ 6.01B, 7.01D (discussing the same principle). Similarly, "[t]he concept of the voluntary
act lies at the very foundation of the criminal law." Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts
and the Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U.
PIr. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1988) (citing statements to this effect from statutes, the Model
Penal Code, and many cases).
96. "An 'act' is a bodily movement .... An act is 'voluntary' when the bodily
movement is the product of conscious effort or determination." 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (15th ed. 1993).
97. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1985) (excluding from the definition of a
"voluntary act" only reflexes, movements during sleep, unconsciousness, and hypnosis,
and "bodily movement[s] that otherwise [are] not a product of the effort or determination
of the actor, either conscious or habitual"); LAFAVE, supra note 94, at § 6.1 (discussing the
different potential definitions of an "act," and endorsing the "modern view" put forth in
the Model Penal Code).
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is therefore a very low standard to clear this first doctrinal step. A
willed movement of the muscles is a voluntary act irrespective of any
external circumstances or pressures.99
External pressures only become relevant at the second doctrinal
step. This second step only applies to those that have committed
voluntary acts; an individual who has failed to act, or whose act was
involuntary, does not proceed beyond the first step. At the second
step, the law asks whether some reason exists such that the individual
should nevertheless be excused from liability for his voluntary act.' 00
An excuse operates as a type of affirmative defense. 0 ' Duress is one
such excuse. 02 The substantive law, usually a statute, determines
which excuses, if any, are available for a particular offense.0 3
Courts do not always properly distinguish these two analytical
steps. Even the United States Supreme Court has made this error. In
Fedorenko v. United States,'" the Court considered whether a
naturalized citizen could be denaturalized following the discovery
98. For example, reflexive movements and movements during sleep are not voluntary
acts. See SHAPO, supra note 94, at 1 6.01.
99. See Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 357 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting)
(quoting TORCIA, supra note 96, at § 52) ("[I]f a person threatens another with harm
unless he commits a crime, and thereby causes the crime to be committed, the coerced
person has performed an act . . . ."); see also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2
cmt. b (1965) ("If the actor's will is in fact manifested by some muscular contraction,
including those which are necessary to the speaking of words, it is not necessary that his
will operate freely and without pressure from outside circumstances.").
100. See DAVID C. BRODY & JAMES R. ACKER, CRIMINAL LAW 160 (2d ed. 2010).
101. Id. Besides excuses, there is one other species of affirmative defense in criminal
law-justification defenses. Id. Although not relevant to the present inquiry, justifications,
such as necessity and self-defense, are also considered at this second step: Assuming the
defendant committed a voluntary act, was the act nonetheless justified? Id.
102. See TORCIA, supra note 96, at § 52 ("[W]hen a defendant engages in conduct
which would otherwise constitute a crime, it is a defense that he was coerced to do so by a
threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury."); see, e.g., Edwards v. State, 106 S.W.3d
833, 843 (Tex. App. 2003) (explaining that duress is an affirmative defense, to be proved
based on a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 51-52 (Wash.
1994) (explaining that duress excuses conduct that is otherwise unlawful); LAFAVE, supra
note 94, at § 9.7(a) ("One who, under the pressure of an unlawful threat from another
human being to harm him (or to harm a third person), commits what would otherwise be a
crime may, under some circumstances, be excused for doing what he did and thus not be
guilty of the crime in question.").
103. For example, duress is not usually a defense to murder. See generally People v.
Anderson, 50 P.3d 368 (Cal. 2002) (stating the general rule that duress is unavailable as a
defense to murder); McMillian v. State, 51 A.3d 623 (Md. 2012) (holding that duress was a
permissible defense as to the underlying felony in a felony-murder prosecution, but not as
a defense to a murder charge based on other theories).
104. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
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that he had worked as a guard at a Nazi concentration camp. 0 The
petitioner had lied about his past on his visa and naturalization
applications.0 6 He argued that his misrepresentation was not
material, and therefore not a basis for denaturalization, because he
was only present at the camp as a Russian prisoner of war and was
forced to act as a guard by his Nazi captors.o'0 As a result, he claimed
that the "Persecutor Bar" did not render him inadmissible to the
United States." The Court accepted that the petitioner's actions
were "involuntary," but held that the Persecutor Bar applied
regardless of whether he acted voluntarily or not because the statute
contained no exception for duress or involuntariness.' But the Court
muddled its terminology. In no sense could the guard's actions have
been involuntary. An act is voluntary if it is the result of the willed
contraction of the muscles.110 The petitioner did not contend that he
was acting unconsciously or reflexively when he served as a guard."'
Rather, he argued that his captors' threats forced him to act."2 His
argument was therefore premised on external circumstances and was
properly classified as the affirmative defense of duress.113
The Supreme Court confused the two separate inquiries.
Involuntariness goes to the first question: Was there a voluntary
act?114 By contrast, duress goes to the second question: Assuming
there was a voluntary act, do any external factors excuse that act?"'
This is not the exact same mistake as the Barahona court made, but it
illustrates that courts frequently confuse the "voluntary act" inquiry
and the "duress" inquiry. Duress and involuntariness should never be
considered together because, properly analyzed, duress is only
105. Id. at 493. Unlike the scenario in Barahona, the alien's work as a guard in
Fedorenko is clearly an act rather than an omission.
106. Id. at 496-97.
107. Id. at 500-02.
108. Id. The Persecutor Bar appears at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). The Bar prevents
those who have "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion" from obtaining asylum and certain other immigration benefits.
Id. For a discussion of modern case law addressing the persecutor bar, see generally
Martine Forneret, Note, Pulling the Trigger: An Analysis of Circuit Court Review of the
"Persecutor Bar," 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1007 (2013).
109. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
110. See supra notes 95-96.
111. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 500.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 100-02102 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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relevant once the court determines that the defendant committed a
voluntary act."'
Granted, the Justices' misuse of terminology had no impact on
the result in Fedorenko. Analyzed properly, the Court would have
addressed the issues as follows. At the first step, there was clearly a
voluntary act. There was an affirmative action rather than an
omission, and that action was the result of a willed muscular
contraction."' The petitioner was therefore a "persecutor" unless,
moving to the second step, the statute afforded him any applicable
excuses for his conduct." The statute did not contain any exception
for duress.119 The "correct" approach would therefore have yielded
the same result as the Court in fact reached: The petitioner was
barred as a persecutor and was thus inadmissible and subject to
denaturalization. 120 Nonetheless, in some cases, there may be serious
consequences to a court's failure to conduct the proper two-step
inquiry. Barahona is one such case.
B. The Barahona Court Answered the Wrong Question
Both the majority and the dissent in Barahona provided correct
answers to the questions they posed in their respective opinions. But
only Judge Wynn reached the right result in the case. The majority,
by neglecting to conduct the proper two-step inquiry, 121 answered the
wrong question.
The majority asked whether Barahona's conduct fell within a
duress or involuntariness exception to the Material Support Bar. 122
The resolution of that question-that the statute does not contain a
duress exceptionl23-was the correct one.124 However, the court
116. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
117. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 500.
118. Id. at 513.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 518.
121. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
122. Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2012).
123. Id. at 355-56.
124. The court provided substantial support for the view that duress is irrelevant. See
supra notes 103, 119 and accompanying text. There are also some strong arguments
weighing against the court's reading of the statute. For example, the principal policy
behind the Material Support Bar-national security-is arguably not implicated when the
alien's support for terrorism occurred under duress. Although there is very little legislative
history accompanying the Material Support Bar, congressional discussions over
amendments to the Material Support Bar make clear that national security is the principal
rationale for the provision. See 150 CONG. REC. H8885 (2004) (statement of Rep. Green)
("[W]e cannot allow our welcoming arms to be a tool for terrorists who seek our
downfall."). In addition, national security is a constant theme even in the plain language of
3312013]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
skipped the first step of the essential two-step inquiryl 25: It failed to
ask whether the defendant had committed a voluntary act at all.126
Had.the court begun with this question, it would have concluded, like
Judge Wynn,127 that Barahona did not commit an act at all, but rather
a mere omission. The court would never have reached the second step
of the Chevron inquiry and would not have been required even to
consider the duress issue. The presence or absence of affirmative
defenses would be moot because Barahona's mere acquiescence was
insufficient to trigger the statute's prima facie requirement of an act.
Barahona did not commit any act sufficient to trigger the
Material Support Bar. Rather, his failure to prevent the FMLN
guerillas from using his home was a classic omission. 28 In Judge
Wynn's words, Barahona "did not prevent the guerillas from
occupying his home."129 There is no indication in the statute that a
mere omission, or failure to act, triggers the Material Support Bar. To
the contrary, the statute explicitly requires "an act."' 30 When
Congress intends to legislate for omissions, it explicitly says so.131
Moreover, it is unsurprising that the Material Support Bar
applies only to aliens who have committed acts that have materially
assisted terrorists. This is also the case in the context of criminal law.
It is a federal crime to "provide[] material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization." 3 2 There is no suggestion in the statute
or case law that a person who merely failed to prevent terrorist
activities would be guilty of a crime. This fits the general principle in
the law, whereby liability attaches to acts, but rarely to omissions.'33
the statute. For example, the Secretary of State only has authority to list a group as a
"terrorist organization" if it "threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2012). Even with these
counterarguments, the BIA's interpretation of the duress issue would have been
satisfactory under the deferential Chevron standard.
125. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
126. The IJ and the BIA failed to even consider whether Barahona committed an act.
See Barahona, 691 F.3d at 357 (Wynn, J., dissenting). They did not, therefore, consider
whether, on the facts, there was or was not an act. Id. The BIA's interpretation was
therefore legally erroneous.
127. Id. at 358.
128. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
129. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 357 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) (2012).
131. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1054(a) (addressing the civil liability of the United States
when a plaintiff's legal malpractice claim is based on the "act or omission" of a member of
the legal staff in the Department of Defense); 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (criminalizing "any act or
omission" involving gambling on Indian lands).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
133. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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Altogether, there is no persuasive argument that the Material
Support Bar applies to aliens based on mere omissions. The
Barahona majority did not even consider the distinction between acts
and omissions in interpreting the statute; it instead jumped ahead to
the involuntariness and duress issues. 134
While the Supreme Court's erroneous analysis did not affect the
final outcome in Fedorenko,13 5 the Fourth Circuit's mistake in
Barahona was central to the outcome. If the majority in Barahona
had asked the correct question, it should have concluded that, based
on the plain meaning of the statute, the Material Support Bar does
not apply to an alien who has not committed any affirmative act. This
conclusion would have required a reversal of the BIA decision 36 and
a remand to reconsider whether to grant Barahona the relief he
sought. 137
C. The Principal Objections to this View of the Case are
Unpersuasive
There are two principal objections to the view of the case that
this Recent Development has so far advanced. First, one could argue
that Barahona committed an affirmative act. Second, there is a
potential argument that the Fourth Circuit adopted an interpretation
that, whether theoretically correct or not, conforms to the analyses of
other courts. Neither objection is persuasive.
1. If Barahona Committed Some Affirmative Act on the Facts of the
Case, the Court Should Have Said So
The strongest potential objection to the analysis in this Recent
Development is based on the facts of the case. Critics may argue that,
in allowing the guerillas to use his home, Barahona must have
performed some affirmative act rather than merely failing to act. As a
result, the Fourth Circuit would have reached the same outcome even
134. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 353-54.
135. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
136. The correct analysis would result in a reversal under the first prong of Chevron.
"[I]f Congress has spoken clearly on the precise question at issue, the statutory language
controls." Barahona, 691 F.3d at 354 (quoting Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th
Cir. 2009)).
137. For an explanation of why Barahona would have been eligible for "special rule"
cancellation of removal, see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. Cancellation of
removal is a discretionary form of relief. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
There is therefore no guarantee that the BIA would have granted Barahona cancellation
of removal. However, having satisfied all of the other criteria for cancellation of removal,
he would at least have been eligible for relief.
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if it had properly interpreted the statute. Such an act would subject
Barahona to the Material Support Bar"8 and therefore render him
inadmissible.139
This objection may come in one of two forms. First, critics may
assume that Barahona must have taken some additional affirmative
steps to assist the FMLN guerillas beyond the facts mentioned in the
opinion. Barahona conceded that he did sometimes provide
affirmative assistance: He occasionally gave the guerillas directions.'40
It is not clear why the opinion did not focus on these affirmative acts,
but the most likely explanation seems to be that the court did not find
that these acts satisfied the statute's materiality requirement.14 '
Whatever the explanation, the Fourth Circuit was deciding on the
facts before it. It is therefore unhelpful to speculate as to the
existence of additional facts; whether they existed or not, they were
not central to the court's decision.
A more convincing version of this objection would focus on
Barahona's allowing the guerillas into his home. One could argue that
this was not a simple one-off transaction; he did not simply fail to
deny access on one isolated occasion. The guerillas used his kitchen
for almost a year.'4 2 During this time, it is hard to imagine that he
avoided performing any kind of affirmative act of material assistance,
such as opening the door to allow them in. This is not only a
voluntary, affirmative act; it is also a material one. This is because the
statute, as an example of "material support," includes the provision of
"a safe house."14' To provide a person with a safe house does not
seem to require substantial physical action. While there is no case law
on the precise meaning of "safe house," the plain language of the
statute seems to suggest that Congress contemplated that any act that
gives terrorists a place to hide or shelter-even if that just involves
opening a door and letting terrorists in-would be material.
If this were true, then the Fourth Circuit reached the correct
outcome. If Barahona in fact performed affirmative actions that
138. This would fall squarely within the statute because it would be "an act that the
actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support ... to a terrorist
organization." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) (2012).
139. See id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I).
140. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 352.
141. See § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (requiring material support and defining it to include
providing "a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons,... explosives,
or training" (emphasis added)).
142. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 351.
143. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
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materially assisted the FMLN by providing a safe house, this would
be a voluntary act that is sufficient to trigger the Material Support
Bar.'" Barahona could only then prevail by demonstrating that he
was acting under duress, and that the Material Support Bar contains
an exception for those whose assistance occurred under duress. But
this leads to the question that the majority in fact answered: The Bar
does not contain a duress exception.145 On this interpretation, the
court would have been correct to uphold the BIA's decision.
While this argument is a strong one, it does not cure the
deficiencies in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning. As fact-finder, the IJ
did not conclude that Barahona performed any affirmative acts. And
in recounting Barahona's testimony before the IJ, the court took care
to point out that he did not give any affirmative assistance. 46 For
example, the Fourth Circuit noted that the guerillas "always brought
their own food."'47 Again, it is unhelpful to speculate on whether the
facts before the IJ were complete. And if the majority really wanted
to decide that Barahona committed an affirmative act, this should
have been noted in the opinion. Aside from the reference to
Barahona giving the guerillas directions, there is no mention-in
either the facts section or the court's analysis-of Barahona
performing any affirmative acts.
As written, the opinion breeds confusion. By skipping over the
"voluntary act" requirement entirely, it leaves the reader unclear on
the way in which the majority really conceptualized the case1 48 : Did
they ignore the statute's explicit "act" requirement altogether, or did
they believe that the commission of an affirmative act was so
obvious-despite the dissent-that the question did not require
discussion? The majority should have engaged directly with Judge
Wynn's dissent, which would have forced them to confront all of the
issues. If they disagreed with the dissent's view that Barahona's
conduct did not involve any affirmative acts,'49 they could have
provided a principled basis for that disagreement before moving on to
the duress issue.
144. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
146. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 356.
147. Id. at 352.
148. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
149. See Barahona, 691 F.3d at 358 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
2013] 335
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
2. National Security Concerns Do Not Justify Applying the Material
Support Bar to Omissions
The second major point of contention with the view of Barahona
articulated in this Recent Development may be that it potentially
undermines the level of national security protection that the Material
Support Bar provides. Critics may argue that, in order to provide an
appropriate level of protection, Congress had to draw some lines in
enacting the statute. Of course, in drawing lines, a statute may catch
some aliens who are "undeserving" of being found inadmissible.
Critics may argue that Congress should err on the side of caution,
drawing broad lines to catch all of the aliens that may threaten
national security, even at the expense of barring some aliens who
would not pose a true threat to the United States.'s In addition, the
legislative history behind the Material Support Bar shows that a
strong concern for national security is what motivated Congress to
pass the law in the first place.15 ' As a result, one may argue that it is
correct to interpret the statute as barring everyone who has materially
assisted terrorists, even where that assistance resulted from a mere
failure to prevent terrorism; those who have assisted through
omissions may still be more dangerous than those who have never
assisted in any way. Furthermore, aliens who have only supported
terrorism by way of omission are still able to seek a discretionary
waiver.152 The Attorney General can therefore make exceptions as
warranted,' but as a practical matter it is arguably more appropriate
for the law to exclude all of these supporters as a prima facie rule.
While these national security concerns are legitimate and were
central to Congress's decision to enact the Material Support Bar, they
do not justify interpreting the Material Support Bar as covering aliens
who have provided assistance through omissions. There are two main
reasons for this. First, the view advanced in this Recent Development,
and in Judge Wynn's dissent, 154 is not a normative argument. It does
not suggest that aliens whose assistance has involved mere omissions
should be excluded from the Material Support Bar because it is unfair
150. See generally John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 565 (2007) (emphasizing national security concerns in
interpreting the Constitution).
151. See supra note 124.
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A) (2012). Barahona's attempt to obtain such a waiver was
unsuccessful. See supra note 57.
153. In practice, this discretion is normally exercised by the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security. See supra note 22.
154. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 356-58 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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to render them inadmissible. Rather, the argument is a purely positive
one: Congress, by the plain language of the statute, only intended the
Material Support Bar to apply to those who have provided material
support via an affirmative act."' This argument is sufficient alone
because the reviewing court approaches the agency interpretation
with a high level of deference. It can reverse the BIA's decision only
on an error of law' 56 and, based on Chevron, cannot reverse if the
agency's interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute."'
In Barahona, the BIA interpretation should have failed because it
was contrary to a clear expression of congressional intent.
Moreover, even as a normative argument, excluding omissions
from the Material Support Bar would still have merit. Applying the
Material Support Bar to all those whose omissions may have assisted
terrorists would be an extremely broad, and arguably unwarranted,
step. Would the Bar then apply to all those who failed to report
terrorism, or to physically prevent it? Would reporting terrorism even
be enough if the reporter had already opened his door when
threatened by terrorists? Would it even be enough for Barahona to
abandon his home once terrorists began to use it? Would he be forced
to burn down his home? In other words, how could a person in
Barahona's shoes possibly comply with his duty? The duty imposed
on him is a far broader duty than the law usually imposes on
anyone 15 and would be incredibly difficult to adjudicate. As the next
Part will demonstrate, this construction would also apply
disproportionately to asylum seekers.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit in Barahona did not intend or
purport to interpret the Material Support Bar broadly enough to
encapsulate omission-based assistance. Rather, the court limited its
review to the question of whether the Bar contained a duress or
involuntariness exception." The majority's misapplication of the Bar
to an alien who had merely acquiesced in terrorist conduct appeared
to be an unintended consequence of its mistaken analysis rather than
a deliberate goal. Thus, it would be wrong to read Barahona as
correctly determining, on national security grounds, the scope of the
conduct that the Material Support Bar covers. The Fourth Circuit did
155. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
156. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 353 (majority opinion).
157. Id. at 354 (citing Midi v. Holder, 566 F.3d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 2009) ("If ... the
statute is silent or ambiguous, we defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable.")).
158. Id. at 357 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
159. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
160. Barahona, 691 F.3d at 353 (majority opinion).
2013] 337
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
not even purport to address that issue. Neither a strict construction of
the statute nor a policy-oriented approach justifies the application of
the Material Support Bar to aliens who have assisted terrorists by way
of mere omissions.
IV. ALLOWING ACQUIESCENCE TO TRIGGER THE MATERIAL
SUPPORT BAR WOULD HAVE TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS FOR
ASYLUM SEEKERS
The Material Support Bar is a ground of inadmissibility and
therefore applies to all categories of prospective immigrants.16 ' At the
same time, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the statute, implicitly
extending the Bar to cover those who have acquiesced in terrorist
conduct in addition to those who have affirmatively assisted in it,'62 is
likely to have a disproportionate impact on asylum seekers. This
effect is likely because of the large potential overlap between those
who have legitimate claims to asylum and those who have been
forced to acquiesce with terrorists' conduct, without committing any
affirmative acts of assistance. The goal in this Section is not to argue
that the statutory requirements of the Material Support Bar should be
amended. Others have already examined in detail the ways in which
the Bar, even according to its usual interpretation, causes problems
for those seeking asylum.'63 The more modest goal of this Recent
Development is to demonstrate the particular way in which
Barahona's application of the Bar to omissions threatens additional
negative impacts on asylum seekers. This group, more than any other,
is likely to suffer from the Fourth Circuit's doctrinal errors.
Congress has vested in the Attorney General discretion to grant
asylum in the United States to an individual who has a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality,
161. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Steven H. Schulman, Victimized Twice: Asylum Seekers and the Material-
Support Bar, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 949 (2010) (explaining that the BIA's interpretation of
the Bar leads to its finding many terrorism victims inadmissible, including those who have
been forced to pay ransoms for release from capture); Report, Unintended Consequences:
Refugee Victims of the War on Terror, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 759 (2006) (documenting in
detail a wide range of agency determinations on issues surrounding the Material Support
Bar, and concluding that "the terms 'material support' and 'terrorist organization' have
few limiting principles"); Kathryn White, Note, A Chance for Redemption: Revising the
"Persecutor Bar" and "Material Support Bar" in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 191 (2010) (observing that the Material Support Bar fails to distinguish
between adult members of terrorist organizations and those who have been forced to
serve as child soldiers for the organizations).
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political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.16" As a
result, by definition, asylum seekers are coming to the United States
from places where they faced harm or the threat of harm.165 In many
cases, this threat may have come from groups that the Department of
State has designated as "foreign terrorist organizations," many of
which are anti-government or separatist groups.166 Asylum seekers
may have lived among these groups for long periods of time and, as in
Barahona itself, day-to-day existence may depend on some degree of
cooperation with occupying terrorist organizations.167 In fact, it may
very well have been this forced cooperation that prompted these
refugees to seek asylum in the United States in the first place.
Followed to its logical conclusion, treating omissions as sufficient
to trigger the Material Support Bar would be problematic. It would
make virtually all asylum seekers inadmissible if they come from
areas that are occupied by terrorist organizations. On this reasoning,
the Bar would even apply in the "absurd" situations that Judge Wynn
described.168 An alien would be inadmissible if, for example, he has
been forced to flee his home and knows that the terrorists will likely
occupy it.'69 He would also be inadmissible, even more absurdly, if he
fails to report the actions of a terrorist organization, even when the
government is in the midst of a civil war and is powerless to stop the
group. In some circumstances, he will have nobody to whom he can
report the terrorists. He may, as in Barahona's situation, have a
legitimate fear of retaliation if he reports the terrorist actions.
164. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(b) (2012); id. § 1101(a)(42) (defining a "refugee" based
on the well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of any of those five associations); id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (preventing the Attorney General from returning an individual to a
country in which his life or freedom would be threatened based on any of those
associations).
165. See Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that "persecution" is
not statutorily defined, but explaining it as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those
who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive" (quoting
Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995))); Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th
Cir. 1991) (" 'Persecution' means, in immigration law, punishment for political, religious,
or other reasons that our country does not recognize as legitimate." (quoting Zalega v.
INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990))).
166. See § 1189(a) (delegating authority to the Secretary of State to determine those
groups that should be listed as "foreign terrorist organizations"). See generally In re S-K-,
23 I. & N. Dec. 936 (B.I.A. 2006); Dep't of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
A good example is Barahona itself, in which the anti-government rebels took over
Barahona's village and threatened inhabitants with violence. See supra notes 34-41 and
accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
168. Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 358 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting).
169. See id.
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Following the interpretation of the Material Support Bar in
Barahona, how would a court treat an asylum applicant from
Colombia who had been stopped at gunpoint while driving and forced
to surrender his vehicle to members of the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia who were engaged in drug trafficking? What
about a shop owner in Somalia who, under threat of execution, failed
to prevent Al-Shabaab insurgents from raiding his inventory for
supplies? There is a danger in these situations that an unduly broad
application of the Material Support Bar would prevent these
persecuted and non-threatening individuals from gaining asylum in
the United States. Barahona brings about an unwarranted
magnification of the impact of the Material Support Bar on asylum
seekers: Mere acquiescence, without any affirmative action, is
sufficient to turn a terrorist victim into a terrorist supporter. This
mislabeling is significant in itself, but its consequences are even more
troubling. If the United States denies victims the opportunity to
escape, their only choice is to continue living with the daily threat of
violence and persecution and to continue acquiescing to their terrorist
oppressors.
CONCLUSION
Barahona was wrongly decided because it was wrongly analyzed.
Rather than focusing on the preliminary question of whether
Barahona committed an act that would trigger the Material Support
Bar, the majority jumped ahead to determine whether there is a
duress exception to the Material Support Bar. Although it was right
to conclude that there is no such exception, the court should not have
reached the duress issue at all. The threshold question, raised in
Judge Wynn's dissent, is whether Barahona committed an affirmative
act. Had the majority addressed this question, it would have likely
concluded that no affirmative act occurred that was sufficient to
trigger the Material Support Bar. On this basis, the BIA's
interpretation should have failed at the first step of the Chevron test,
and the BIA's decision should therefore have been reversed.
As a result of the Barahona court's holding, the Material Support
Bar will render inadmissible aliens who have done nothing more than
merely acquiesce with occupying terrorist forces in order to ensure
their own survival. This could have especially severe ramifications for
asylum seekers. Future courts should apply the Bar by interpreting
the statute according to its plain meaning and follow the two-step
process advanced in this Recent Development. On this reasoning,
acquiescence would not be enough to bar aliens from the United
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States. The rule would operate as it should, keeping out supporters of
terrorism while protecting victims.
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